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Abstract 
The ‘symbolic capacity’ has come to be seen as a core trait of anatomically modern 
humans, and probably separates them cognitively and behaviourally from all other 
hominins. While archaeologists agree on what aspects of the archaeological record 
constitute evidence of symbolism, such as burials, use of pigments, and personal 
ornamentation, only generic concepts of ‘symbolism’ are invoked from these, resulting in 
a simplistic discourse about its origins. I try to problematise the concept of symbolism, 
using these archaeological categories, breaking each down into differing levels of 
symbolic sophistication. Following this, I try to link these to Dunbar’s levels of intention, 
and explore how one might identify these from the archaeological record. I conclude by 
making a necessarily coarse comparison of Neandertals and modern humans in terms of 
the expression of these characteristics. 
Introduction: living symbols, dead symbols 
Palaeoanthropology is unique in providing insights into the long-term evolution of human 
behaviour. To a certain extent it should also provide unique insights into the cognitive 
capacities which underlie and facilitate certain behaviours. It should, at least in theory, 
provide middle range bridging between the modern human mind and that of our closest 
evolutionary relatives, the great apes. From what scholars can tell, a vast cognitive gulf 
separates the two; and at the heart of this difference apparently lies symbolism. If one 
accepts in a broad sense that religion is itself symbolic, then it is clear that a symbolic 
capacity and religious imperative is a fundamental part - perhaps inevitability; (Boyer 
2008) - of being human. It is no surprise therefore that documenting the emergence of 
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symbolism has in recent years become central to palaeoanthropology. One should add it 
to the major events of human social development that traditionally involved broad 
spectrum economies, agriculture, writing and state societies. In fact, it would be difficult 
to conceive of these without symbolic underpinning. 
Archaeologists have, however, approached the archaeological record in relatively simple 
ways, focussing on simple objects as being simply indicative of symbolism. Thus, the 
recovery of a used fragment of ochre becomes proxy evidence of symbolism. Such an 
approach does not take us very far, and certainly does not allow us to explore nuanced 
cognitive development among the later homininae. We should think of symbols as not 
just material cultural object or things in the mind but as ways of engaging with the world. 
Following on from Piercean semiotics it becomes clear that what potentially makes signs 
symbolic is not necessarily inherent in the object itself but is derived from its context, 
particularly how the sign and its signifier are regarded in relation (Schults 2009). Thus 
context is all-important, and as Sloane Wilson (2009) has noted, to understand the 
development of symbolism we must search for the context that made it adaptive. Here, I 
try to widen a contextual approach to the long-term evolutionary emergence of hominin 
symbol use, deconstructing what we mean by symbolism. 
 
Problematising the archaeological debate: symbolic revolutions that were or were 
not 
The emergence of ‘symbolism’ over the course of hominin evolution has in the past few 
years become arguably the most important object of archaeological study in the quest for 
defining what makes us ‘behaviourally modern’ humans. Palaeolithic archaeologists 
seem to agree that the ‘symbolic capacity’ or ‘symbolically-mediated behaviour’ is a 
defining - perhaps the defining - behavioural trait of Homo sapiens, but debate has begun 
in the last few years as to whether ‘pre-modern’ hominins possessed symbolic capacities 
and, if so, to what extent (see, for example, Mellars 1991, 1995; McBrearty and Brooks 
2000; Wadley 2001; Henshilwood and Marean 2003; d’Errico et al. 2003 and particularly 
d’Errico 2003). Despite this, it is surprising that there is still no agreement on a definition 
of symbolism (Wadley 2009). Instead, the debate so far has often centred upon a ‘trait 
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list’ of behaviours that appear in the late Middle Pleistocene and Upper Pleistocene that 
were apparently novel to the hominin repertoire, although as d’Errico (2003: 199) has 
succinctly observed these traits are no more than a list of the major archaeological 
features that characterise the Upper Palaeolithic in Europe”. Similarly, Henshilwood and 
Marean (2003) have rightly emphasised that the trait list is Eurocentric in origin and thus 
of questionable relevance to behaviours which apparently emerged first elsewhere, and 
have consequently proposed new traits with which to distinguish behavioural ‘modernity’ 
which has given the debate a new, at present Afrocentric, bias. 
Whether African, European or, for that matter, Asian (a land mass far larger than Europe 
and the archaeologically explored areas of Africa put together, for which relatively little 
is known) (Dennell 2008), implicit in all perspectives is the progressivist notion of an 
accumulation of novel behaviours that include symbolism. As with other aspects of the 
palaeoanthropological record (notably the geographical dispersal of hominins) 
archaeologists tend to assume that from their point of emergence, hominins and 
behaviours were present continuously from then on; dots signifying new behaviours are 
placed on time charts and the dots are then joined up, creating an impression of gradually 
increasing behavioural complexity. This is apparent, for example, in McBrearty and 
Brooks’ (2000) reorientation of the development of behavioural modernity to Africa and 
to a long-term gradualism, who see a “fitful expansion” that was “built incrementally” 
(ibid.: 531) over the long duration “since at least 250 ka” (ibid.: 532). With regard to 
symbolism they discuss special treatment of the dead (no evidence before the Upper 
Pleistocene and, in fact, no uncontroversial evidence for the African MSA); beads and 
ornaments (again no evidence before the Upper Pleistocene - see discussion below); and 
use of pigments (no figurative art until the LSA, the earliest date usually quoted being 26-
28 ka BP for the Apollo 11 Cave plaques which are not reliably dated and may be much 
younger, but recovery of pigments from various African MSA sites spans the last 
250,000 years). Leaving aside controversially dated examples the evidence for early use 
of pigments comprises less than one dozen sites, far lower than the number of European 
Middle Palaeolithic sites with the same. 
Of the African examples, however, a small group of sites cluster around 100 ka BP; a 
handful of other sites may furnish much older examples; and others post-date 80 ka BP. 
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The earliest manifestations are few and are hampered by imprecise dating. ‘Red stained 
earth’, numerous haematite fragments, ochre and grinding stones occur in a context older 
than 250 ka BP at Kapthurin; Natural stone balls coloured with manganese were 
recovered from Olorgesailie site BOK1 dating to >340 ka BP, and at site GOK1 a stone 
block coloured with ochre and bearing grinding marks was recovered from a context 
dating to 290-493 ka BP (Brooks and Yellen 2009). At least 150,000 years later than this 
group, a second comprises red ochre fragments at Klasies River Mouth >100 ka (although 
the majority of pieces are younger than 80 ka); haematite pencils “throughout the MSA 
sequence at Border Cave” (McBrearty and Brooks 2000: 528), the base of which has 
been estimated at >100 ka; grinding slabs (not pigment crayons) from Porc Epic, ESR 
dated to 121  6 ka BP; and, most remarkable of the group by far, the numerous ochre 
fragments in all of the main (M1, M2 and M3) levels of Blombos Cave, South Africa, at 
least 18 of which bear engravings which can arguably be grouped into symbolic 
‘traditions’ (Henshilwood et al. 2009). It was generally agreed in the Homo symbolicus 
workshop that it is difficult to interpret the Blombos examples as anything but 
symbolism. This may now be considered a robust archaeological record, but we may not 
be justified in drawing a continuous line from Kapthurin to the Later Stone Age. Well 
over 100,000 years separate Kapthurin from the earliest cluster of sites ~100 ka BP, and 
twenty thousand years or more separate this cluster from more numerous examples <80 
ka BP (Henshilwood and d’Errico 2009). 240,000 years separate the use of pigments at 
Kapthurin and the earliest known appearance of figurative art after (possibly well after) 
40,000 years in Africa. With a burgeoning number of well-excavated MSA sites we 
cannot simply assume this is a factor of recovery, and I shall forward below a falsifiable 
hypothesis to account for this pattern. 
‘Time depth’ is implicit in gradualist models of the emergence of human behaviour, but 
was it a significant aspect of symbolic behaviour? Perhaps we archaeologists implicitly 
assume it is. Once a novel behaviour appears, particularly one as profound as the 
symbolic capacity, it seems logically inconceivable to us that it might disappear again. 
Gaps in the chronological representation of these behaviours are written off as deriving 
simply from the lack of excavated sites, justifying the drawing of solid lines. But why 
should the appearance of these behaviours have been cumulative? Broad surveys of the 
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Eurasian Middle Palaeolithic and African Middle Stone Age show how the appearance 
and chronological trajectories of many behaviours varied considerably region to region 
(even within France, for example), often lacked clear trajectories and in Europe did not 
inevitably lead to the Upper Palaeolithic. ‘Recursive change’, whereby novel traits appear 
in a region, rise in frequency, then disappear can be observed in the Levant and may have 
been widely characteristic of pre-modern behaviour (see papers in Hovers and Kuhn 
2006). As d’Errico and Henshilwood (2009) have noted, there is no continuity in the 
expression of pigment use and personal ornamentation. As this is so, then why might a 
recursive nature not apply for symbolism or, for that matter, religion (Pettitt in press)? 
Chase (e.g. 1999, 2006) has specifically drawn attention to the recursive nature of 
symbolism, arguing that its manifestation should vary depending upon specific 
behavioural contexts, and thus that we should expect its appearance in the archaeological 
record to vary geographically and chronologically.  
If one can challenge the ‘out of Africa 1’ model on palaeontological and archaeological 
grounds (Dennell and Roebroeks 2005) there is no reason why we should not be critical 
of the currently favoured African model for the origins of behavioural modernity (Pettitt 
2007). If regional trajectories of change and ‘recursion’ are characteristic of pre- 
LSA/Upper Palaeolithic hunter-gatherers (see papers in Hovers and Kuhn 2006) then the 
African MSA may not have been so critical to the emergence of modern behaviour after 
all (Pettitt 2007). In this light, the multiregional, multispecies model for the emergence of 
modern behaviour proposed by d’Errico (2003) becomes highly feasible; instead, 
‘”modern” [behavioural] traits may have appeared in different regions and among 
different groups of humans, much as happened later in history with the inventions of 
agriculture, writing, and state society’ (ibid. 200). 
For the purposes of this paper I therefore assume a null hypothesis that there was no 
single centre of emergence of symbolism among hominin societies, or at least that such a 
single centre will not be recognisable archaeologically. Instead of trying in vain to 
identify origins, I shall instead attempt to deconstruct the notion of ‘symbolism’ as used 
by palaeoanthropologists, and suggest a more fragmented way in which it may have 
arisen among hominin groups, both in the long and short terms. I begin by elaborating an 
heuristic scheme using a relatively well documented and debated source of data – 
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personal ornamentation – and then proceed to deconstruct another aspect of behaviour 
seen as behaviourally ‘modern’ by many – the special treatment of the dead. Finally, I try 
to integrate these with Dunbar’s suggestions about the cognitive development of levels of 
intention over the course of hominin evolution to show how symbolism can occur at 
many organisational and cognitive levels. 
 
Material culture symbols among the living 
Symbols only function as such when both a writer and a reader are in accord. In 
archaeology, one tends to focus on the writer (i.e. through their non-perishable creations 
recovered through archaeology), and assume that all persons who came into contact with 
these material culture creations were informed readers, i.e. could decode the intentional 
messages they were created to contain. This need not necessarily have been the case, and 
while an object can be considered as a symbol if it was created to function as such, it 
does not necessarily follow that it was widely or universally successful in that 
functioning. A shell pendant might therefore have functioned symbolically among the 
conspecifics of whatever erstwhile occupant of Blombos Cave made it around 80 ka BP 
(Henshilwood et al. 2004), but its status as a symbol may, or may not, have disappeared 
if it were viewed by other African Homo sapiens populations, or, for that matter, by an 
archaeologist eighty thousand years in the future. The only guide as to the efficiency of a 
symbol’s agency in the past might therefore be an abundance of that symbol, not only on 
one site, but among several sites of the same broad time period. Until we have such an 
archaeological record it might be rash to argue from a handful of sites of widely different 
ages that symbolism was widespread among groups and geographical regions, let alone 
endemic to the species.  
This caution might be applied to a small group of artefacts that are often forwarded as 
potentially very early examples of symbolism. Three examples of these pierres figures 
are known; natural stone cobbles that fortuitously resemble the human form, a 
resemblance which was accentuated by restricted use of deliberate engraving. Two derive 
from the Lower Palaeolithic (from the Levallois-rich site of Berekhat Ram, Israel, 
probably 350-500 ka BP; and from Acheulian deposits at Tan-Tan, Morocco, around 400 
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ka BP), and one from the Middle Palaeolithic (from the late Middle Palaeolithic cave site 
of La Roche Cotard, France ~32 ka [14C] BP). Respectively, these take the form of a 
pebble of basaltic tuff resembling a human torso and head intentionally modified with 
grooves around its ‘neck’ and ‘sides’ (d’Errico and Nowell 2000), a quartzite cobble 
reminiscent of a human body modified with eight grooves and with the addition of red 
pigment (Bednarik 2003), and a flint beach cobble around the periphery of which several 
flakes have been removed and through which a natural perforation runs, into which a 
bone splinter has been wedged, the overall effect resembling a human face (Marquet and 
Lorblanchet 2003). While a sample of three, widely spaced in time, is hardly grounds for 
robust interpretation of pierres figures as unambiguous indicators of early symbolism, we 
should not write them off as casual “lithic doodles” as Dennell (2008: 285) has noted. 
Instead, he argues that like the appearance of precocious lithic technologies in the Lower 
Palaeolithic such as end-scrapers and burins at Berekhet Ram, symbolism (and by 
extension perhaps, ritual) drifted in and out of use. In this case “rather than dismissing 
these objects as non-symbolic that would be regarded as symbolic if found in later 
contexts, it might be advisable to consider instead why they are so rare, and under what 
circumstances they might occur” (ibid.: 285). Indeed, why are these figures not more 
common in the archaeological record? This cannot be due to recovery bias as one might 
argue for figurative art, so we may presumably conclude that their occurrence was 
genuinely rare, evidence of the regionally (or perhaps culturally) varied expression of 
early symbolic systems. But what kind of symbolism? The process begins with a reader, 
as the process is predicated on the initial recognition of the human form in a natural 
object. Thereafter the reader becomes the writer, making artificial modifications of the 
natural object to enhance its resemblance to the human form. The creative process 
therefore relates to the conscious removal of ambiguity in the symbol’s reading. Whether 
or not it was subsequently ‘read’ by its discoverer/creator alone or by others, the object 
must in any general use of the term be considered to be symbolic, because it carries 
within itself an explicit reference to the human body. But that is all; we can infer nothing 
further from its message; ‘I look like a human’. While we cannot of course rule out that 
the pierres figures symbolised a lot more (e.g. ‘I represent my creator, his agency in the 
group while he is not present, and the shared social norms that keep us together’) there is 
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a considerable conceptual gap between the two forms of symbolism. The simplest way in 
which these pierres figures may have been used (if of course they were ‘used’ at all) 
cannot be regarded as cognitively sophisticated as the latter example. We need to 
deconstruct what we as archaeologists mean by symbolism, and I attempt to do so here 
with reference to personal ornamentation. I include pigment use in this argument, for 
which reasons should become apparent. 
Whatever our opinion of the robustness of the earliest evidence for pigment use, some 
have seen the recovery of pigment ‘crayons’ from sites such as Twin Rivers (Zambia) 
and Kapthurin (Kenya) as “…convincing proof of the symbolic use of pigments…” by 
200 ka years ago (d’Errico et al. 2003: 4 my emphasis). No criteria, however, have been 
proposed that allow us to identify from the archaeological record exactly how pigments 
were used (see the useful discussion in Henshilwood et al. 2009 and Wadley 2005). The 
apparent selection of a small selection of colours from a wider variety of those available 
(e.g. Barham 1998) and the selection of highly saturated reds in both South Africa (Watts 
1999) and in Qafzeh Cave, Israel (Hovers et al. 2003) does at least suggest a symbolic 
function, but the problem here is that archaeologists assume a broad interpretation of 
‘symbolism’, namely that if pigments were in use, then whatever their specific use was it 
possessed a symbolic dimension. This is not simply a semantic problem; scales of 
symbolism vary from the simple to the complex, and archaeologists tend to assume only 
the latter. Simple ornaments, in the form of natural shells pierced for suspension, are 
known from secure contexts in Blombos Cave, South Africa for which a date of ~75 ka 
BP is usually cited (Henshilwood et al. 2004); Skhul Cave, Israel in a horizon dated to 
100-135 ka BP; Qafzeh Cave, Israel around 90-100 ka BP (Vanhaeren et al. 2006); the 
Grotte des Pigeons, Taforalt, Morocco possibly around 82 ka BP (Bouzouggar et al. 
2007: although one would like to see the OSL dates on which this is based backed up by 
other methods); Üçağizli Cave, Turkey around 39-41 ka BP and probably the same broad 
age at Ksar Akil, Lebanon (Kuhn et al. 2001), and >35 ka BP from Oued Djebbana, 
Algeria (Vanhaeren et al. 2006)1. Taking due consideration of chronometric imprecision 
                                                 
1 The dates given are those generally cited in the literature. For Skhul, the ornaments were recovered from 
Layer B, for which ESR and U-series dates indicated an age range of 43-134 ka BP ‘but recent ESR and U-
series analyses, including direct dating of a [human] molar from the Skhul II skeleton, indicate ages 
between 100 and 135 ka’ (Vanhaeren et al. 2006, 786). There are, however, large errors associated with the 
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none of these need pre-date 100 ka BP. Taking the mean ages at face value 30,000 years 
or more separate Blombos backwards to Skhul, and forwards to Ksar Akil and Üçağizli1. 
We should therefore be cautious about inferring that “the initial appearance of Upper 
Palaeolithic ornament technologies was essentially simultaneous on three continents” 
(Kuhn et al. 2001: 7641) or that these simple points in time reflect “a long-lasting and 
widespread beadworking tradition [that] existed in Africa and the Levant” (Vanhaeren et 
al. 2006: 1788). A simultaneous emergence and continuous tradition may, of course, 
eventually be demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, but for now the archaeological 
record does not demonstrate this and, I suggest, we should conceive of a null hypothesis 
– there for elimination – that the appearance of traditions of personal ornamentation 
varied region to region and, like the hominin populations themselves were by no means 
continuous. 
If discontinuity and regional variation in use was the rule, it follows that symbols need 
not have functioned in the same ways among different groups, or for that matter between 
different individuals. Assuming that pigment colourants and perforated shells and beads 
were used to ornament the body, one can conceive of different levels of use, from the 
simplest - what one might argue to be non-symbolic decoration - through to concept-
mediated symbolism. Such a scheme of different symbol use need not be cumulative. I 
suggest, for example, that one or several of the following could be in operation at any one 
time or place: 
Decoration: the employment of colouring/ornamentation for visual effect with no 
associated symbolic meaning, or the uninformed reading of an otherwise symbolic code 
(‘I wear red because I like red’) 
                                                                                                                                                 
coupled ESR/U-series dates from this level (including that on Skhul II at 116 +43/-24 ka BP) and the best 
estimate of the age of the Skhul II and IV is  98 +19/-10 ka BP (Grün et al. 2005) which could therefore be 
as young as 78 ka BP at 2. Phase M1 at Blombos, from which 41 perforated tick shells derive, has been 
dated by OSL to 75.6  3.4 ka BP and by TL to 77  6 ka BP (Henshilwood et al. 2004, 304), thus could be 
younger than 70 ka BP at 2. With one infinite conventional radiocarbon date for the open air site of Oued 
Djebbana, I consider it undated even though it has an Aterian attribution (Vanhaeren et al. 2006). Although 
the age of the ornaments from Üçağizli Cave are usually cited at 39-41 ka BP, the age range of five 14C 
dates for Layer H reported by Kuhn et al. (2001) could indicate an age as young as 35 ka BP at 2, and 
ages for the relevant contexts at Ksar Akil are based on poor chronometric dates and estimated 
sedimentation rates.  
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Enhancement: the use of colouring/ornamentation/modification to bring out a simple 
(symbolic) message by enhancing existing clues (‘I wear red as I know you will read it as 
a sign of my strength or be impressed by it’) 
Accessorization: the use of colouring/ornamentation/modification to make a more subtle 
or specific statement than enhancement by acting as a material cultural accessory to 
message (‘I wear red as I know you will recognise it as the regalia of our clan and infer 
from it that were are culturally the same’) 
Full symbolism: the use of colouring/ornamentation/modification to make an explicit 
statement by acting as a full material cultural symbol that a reader can decode complex 
messages from (‘I wear red as, like you, I am a successful hunter and have killed an adult 
eland; it is my right to wear this colour and I therefore command respect from all’) 
Time/space-factored symbolism: the incorporation of temporal and spatial dimensions 
into full symbolism, e.g. beliefs, myths and stories, object biographies and histories (‘I 
wear red only at a specific time, marking the time of the year when the ancestors created 
this land, in honour of the creation myths and to mark out that I am the bearer of this 
knowledge’). 
A fanciful set of examples, but the problem is real: at which of these levels were the tick 
shells and engraved ochre fragments from Blombos Cave functioning? One, or multiple? 
As d’Errico and Henshilwood (2009) have noted, pigment fragments are notoriously 
ambiguous as they ‘do not represent the direct outcome of past symbolic behaviours’. All 
one can do is apply a logical approach to intuitive interpretation. One might rule out 
simple decoration, given that one can observe redundancy in the selection of specific 
shells and creation of specific engravings (suggesting that each had specific meaning) but 
how might we confidently infer the full symbolism or time/space-factored symbolism 
usually assumed by archaeologists from them? The problem is particularly acute on sites 
with the recovery of non-engraved pigment crayons. Leaving aside the often intractable 
arguments that pigments could be used for more prosaic purposes (well demonstrated by 
Wadley 2005 although cf. Watts 1999 and Hovers et al. 2003), we cannot eliminate the 
hypothesis that the recovery of pigment ‘crayons’ alone refers only to decoration or 
enhancement. On the other side of the coin of course a sceptic might argue that if one was 
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to interpret Leonardo’s workshop on the grounds of his pigments alone we might reduce 
him to decorated dunce, but one might propose that we should only confidently interpret 
pigment crayons alone as being indicative of full symbolism when they occur at times 
and places where figurative art or artificial memory systems are also known. In this case 
context would be critical to the elucidation of specific symbolic systems. Interpreting the 
data presented by McBrearty and Brooks (2000) in this light I suggest the following (I 
hope falsifiable) hypothesis for the emergence of these aspects of behavioural modernity 
in Africa: 
1. Simple pigment crayons and pigment processing found before 100 ka BP and back, 
perhaps, to 250 ka BP or beyond represent little more than decoration or enhancement. 
The recovery of large numbers of fragments and, particularly, engravings on fragments or 
other engraved objects in association with pigments would allow us to reject this 
hypothesis. 
2. The floruit of personal ornamentation after 100 ka BP, including traditions of 
engraved designs on ochre, suggests levels of accessorisation or full symbolism was in 
operation around 100 ka BP and after 80 ka BP. 
3. True time/space-factored symbolism, in which figurative art often plays a role, did 
not emerge in Africa until after 40 ka years ago.  
By this argument I would also suggest that the Eurasian Middle Palaeolithic record (at 
least 40 Neandertal sites in Europe and a handful stretching back to the Lower 
Palaeolithic) (d’Errico 2003) shows that some groups of Homo neandertalensis and 
Homo heidelbergensis engaged in decoration or enhancement. Of interest here would be 
the items of personal ornamentation recovered from a Châtelperronian context in Layer X 
of the Grotte du Renne at Arcy-sur-Cure, given that the association of symbolic items 
with the body would be strong indication of symbolism of at least the level of 
enhancement (d’Errico and Henshilwood 2009). It should at least be obvious by now that 
simply referring to these examples as ‘symbolic’ results in the meaningless attribution of 
‘part behavioural modernity’ to the Neandertals. Such attributions take us nowhere; we 
need to define symbolism by deconstructing it, and we need to develop heuristic schemes 
that allow us to explore how we might identify levels of symbolism from the 
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archaeological record (and, perhaps, primatological world – a difficult task, see McGrew 
2009). 
The dead as symbols 
The ‘trait list’ approach treats burial of the dead as an aspect of ‘modern’ behaviour, 
although proponents of the importance of burial do not define why it deserves to be on 
the list. How, for example, does placing a corpse in a shallow grave really differ from a 
female chimpanzee carrying around the body of her dead child for several days or, in one 
case, an entire month (e.g. Goodall 1986; Matsuzawa 2003; Pettitt 2011)? As with 
personal ornamentation, there is no reason why the treatment of the dead could not have 
differed in its symbolic function over the course of hominin evolution. Elsewhere, I argue 
that the social interaction of the living with the dead has a very long evolutionary history, 
beginning with the intellectual interest in the corpse (which I refer to as morbidity) that 
can be observed among extant primates, and became elaborated through the deliberate 
deposition (mortuary caching) of the dead at certain parts of the natural landscape, until 
features for caching are deliberately created (burials) and locales were given specific 
symbolic meaning as places for the dead (Pettitt 2011). Three examples widely separated 
in time and space serve as examples, the first perhaps most controversially. 
The 3-3.5ma old locality AL-333/333w at Hadar (Ethiopia) lies on a steep hill slope, and 
yielded >200 hominin fossils representing nine adults, two juveniles and two infants 
(MNI=13) assigned to Australopithecus afarensis within a small area (Aronson and Taieb 
1981; Johanson et al. 1982). These stand out against a poor background of mammalian 
fauna at the site, and seem to have been covered by sediments fairly rapidly. The lack of 
palaeontology suggests that there was little activity in this point of the landscape. The site 
stands out from other Hadar localities as it is, as Johanson and Shreeve (1989: 87) note, 
“…just hominids littering a hillside”. The question as to how the hominin accumulation 
formed has attracted considerable debate. A dynamic event such as a flood can be ruled 
out on sedimentological grounds, and lack of carnivore modifications of the bones rules 
out predation; furthermore it is difficult to see how an entire group could become bogged 
down on a wet plain to die together on a hill. To my knowledge, no one has advanced a 
hypothesis that sees australopithecines as the active agents of accumulation. I propose 
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that at least thirteen dead individuals came to lie on the hill within a short space of time, 
because they had been deliberately placed there by their conspecifics. The locale seems to 
have been a relatively quiet area on a dynamic and dangerous landscape, perhaps given 
simple meaning as bodies could be placed in the long grass, minimizing the possibility 
that carnivores would scavenge from them. One needs invoke no specific meaning to this 
further than the desire to protect corpses from scavenging or even just to remove them 
from sight, but it is easy to see how, at some cognitive stage in hominin evolution, such 
places might begin to acquire meaning, and in such a case one might see this as relatively 
simple symbolism. 
Secondly, the accumulation of the (complete) bodies of at least 32 individuals assigned to 
Homo heidelbergensis in the Sima de los Huesos (‘Pit of the Bones’) at Atapuerca, Spain, 
offers the earliest intriguing example of the use of a particular place for mortuary 
disposal. Between 400-500 kaBP thousands of bones accumulated in the 13m deep pit 
mainly comprising bears (Ursus deningeri MNI=166), several felids and canids, and the 
hominins, the latter heavily skewed towards prime adults (Arsuaga et al. 1997; Bischoff 
et al. 2003). Lack of decent degrees of carnivore gnawing show that they were not 
responsible for the deposition of the hominin bodies, and degrees of articulation, and lack 
of damage and considerable mixing of the hominin bones, suggest that they are either in 
situ or have not moved far. Concensus seems to be that they were deliberately placed 
here, perhaps at the top of the shaft which may have been open to the air at the time 
(Arsuaga et al. 1997, 2003). The lack of any archaeology in the pit save for one 
Acheulian biface (ibid.) suggests further a non-prosaic nature of the accumulation. It is 
difficult to see this accumulation as anything other than the deliberate caching of the dead 
at this one place, and if this were so, then it must have been given specific meaning as a 
place of the dead, another example of simple association of a place in the landscape with 
death. 
Finally, a parsimonious reading of the Middle Palaeolithic record shows that between 30-
40 simple inhumations of Homo neandertalensis are known, with more inclusive 
estimates approaching 60 (see Pettitt 2002 and references therein). These burials, all 
without the inclusion of grave goods, span the period from 80 – 34 ka BP (possibly a 
little earlier), and overlap with the dates for the earliest burials of Homo sapiens at 
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Qafzeh and Skhul in Israel and Mungo, Australia. Both young and old Neandertals were 
buried, and examples fall into distinct regional groups, notably SW France, Germany, and 
the Levant. Given the relatively low number of burials known despite a rich Middle 
Palaeolithic record, one should not simply conclude from this that ‘Neandertals buried 
their dead’; it may be more apposite to conclude that some Neandertals buried some of 
their dead, some of the time, i.e. what we might call cultural variation. While it is unclear 
whether these simple inhumations were emplaced for prosaic reasons, the use of sites for 
multiple burials and the possible use of grave markers might suggest that some 
underlying belief accounts for the burials. The representation of multiple Neandertals 
among fragmentary remains at several sites is intriguing: at least 25 individuals at 
Krapina; 20 at L’Hortus, France, among which young adults dominate; at least 22 at La 
Quina, France; seven at La Ferrassie of which two are juveniles and three foeti/neonates; 
at least seven at Shanidar cave, Iraq and two in the Feldhoffer cave in the Neander 
Valley; and in Amud and Tabun caves, Israel. At La Ferrassie, several of the grave pits – 
those of children seem to have been covered with large boulders, one of which bore ‘cup 
marks’ (Peyrony 1934). It is tempting to view the latter as specific grave markers, and if 
they are, they are at least simple symbols (message: the dead lie below here). In this light, 
Dunbar’s inclusion of Neandertals into the ‘fourth level intentionality’ may further 
support the notion that by the Late Middle Palaeolithic at least an incipient ritual had 
emerged.  
Three points in time, showing widely different funerary practices, which might have 
operated at different points on the following example scale: 
1. Simple (non-symbolic) observation: little activity beyond morbidity (investigation of 
the corpse, establishment that it is dead, and renegotiation of society now that a member 
has dropped out: ‘It is dead, I am confused’). 
2. Emotive (non-symbolic) interaction: the living interact with the dead; their emotional 
response affects certain simple behaviours of disposal. (‘It is dead, I am mourning; hide 
the corpse away from activity’). 
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3. Associative (symbolic) interaction: the dead is associated with a specific activity at a 
specific place; the place symbolizes the dead. (‘He is dead; he must be disposed of at a 
recognized place’). 
4. Time/Space-factored associative interaction: the agency of the dead is recognized in 
mortuary treatment (who gets special treatment, where and when) and mortuary activity 
is organized in time and space according to social rules. (‘He is dead; he was an elder in 
life and has earned the right to be buried at the place of the elders’). 
One must of course remember that presumably, most human mortuary activity in 
prehistory is invisible to archaeology, but this at least shows that even for 
archaeologically observable mortuary activity one cannot simply argue that it is 
‘symbolic’ in any straightforward way. I propose that simple observation and morbidity 
has very deep evolutionary roots (at least back to Miocene apes); that emotive interaction 
with the dead might have originated in the earliest hominin communities; that associative 
interaction with the dead (and thus a degree of symbolism) originated at least among 
Homo heidelberbergensis populations in the Middle Pleistocene and became more 
elaborate with Homo neandertalensis and early Homo sapiens, but that the earliest true 
time/space-factored associative interaction can as yet only be recognized among 
European Mid Upper Palaeolithic (Gravettian) burials, which represent a highly-
redundant (and often pathological) sub-section of society in which social differentiation 
seems to have been one of the criteria governing the disposal of the dead (e.g. Zilhão and 
Trinkaus 2002; Zilhão 2003; Pettitt 2006; Formicola 2007).  
The evolution of Homo symbolicus: gradual, abrupt, or fragmentary? 
Despite progressivist narratives the story of hominin evolution is in a sense largely one of 
failure: multiple dispersals from Africa (and one assumes elsewhere) when climatic and 
environmental circumstances allowed, most of which resulted in local extinctions as 
environments shut down in response to climatic downturns associated with Heinrich 
events. In the long-term context as discussed above, behavioural repertoires of the Middle 
Stone Age and Middle Palaeolithic waxed and waned, were situationally dependent, and 
beyond drawing upon general repertoires, regionally independent (see Chase 1999, 2006 
and papers in Hovers and Kuhn 2006). Such attenuated and regionally-differing dispersal 
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and behavioural trajectories provide an appropriate context for the evolution of the 
symbolic capacity and its expression, which itself, I argue, should have had a recursive 
and interrupted developmental pattern. While I have concentrated upon specific examples 
to try to deconstruct what archaeologists mean by ‘symbolism’, a general evolutionary 
context has been provided by Dunbar, into which, I suggest, symbolic evolution might fit. 
Dunbar (2003) has interpreted brain evolution in terms of intentional states – reflexive 
sequences of belief states – which range from one (‘I believe that…’), through typical 
human functioning of three, to the normal human limit of four. Although it became 
apparent in the Homo symbolicus workshop that there is considerable debate as to 
whether one can pigeon hole intentional states in this way and whether such a 
classificatory system is of heuristic use for cognitive evolution, it at least forms a useful 
framework within which to conceptualise symbolic evolution. To Dunbar, Theory of 
mind, which in modern humans emerges between 4-5 years of age, requires level 2 
intention (‘I believe that you believe…’). Requiring individuals to conform to social 
norms requires three levels of intention (‘I want you to believe that you must behave how 
we want’), whereas religion, at least as we conceive of it, requires level four intention (‘I 
have to believe that you suppose that there are supernatural beings who understand that 
you and I desire that things happen in a certain way’). Dunbar has suggested that levels 
of intentionality increased over the course of hominin evolution, and can be equated with 
increasing brain size, group size and grooming time. This would grant australopithecines 
approaching two levels of intentionality (thus a theory of mind), archaic Homo such as 
Homo erectus and Homo heidelbergensis three levels and four levels to Neandertals and 
anatomically modern humans. In light of the latter it is perhaps not surprising that it is 
with both Neandertals and modern humans that burial of the dead was from time to time 
practised. Might Dunbar’s conclusions be relevant to the origins of symbolism? 
While systems of decoration and enhancement I introduced above could function with 
two levels of intentionality (‘I know that you will be impressed’) ‘true’ symbolism should 
require three (for a full symbol to work ‘I need to know that you understand this 
symbol/place means this’). By extension, however, giving symbolic integration to people 
and places requires four (‘I need to know, that you understand, that this place gives 
meaning to this thing/person/act’). It follows that the evolution of the symbolic capacity 
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(although not always accompanied by symbolic expression of that capacity) should have 
paralleled cognitive evolution, and it is the task of the archaeologist to identify the 
explicit way in which this might have occurred. In Table 1, I try to place the examples 
discussed above in Dunbar’s context of cognitive evolution. 
 
Intentional 
level 
Hominin grade Dunbar’s 
example 
Personal 
ornamentation 
Mortuary 
activity 
1 Pre-
australopithecines 
& 
australopithecines 
I believe 
that… 
Decoration Simple 
observation (I 
believe that 
you are dead) 
2 Australopithecines I believe that 
you believe… 
Enhancement (I 
know you will 
be impressed) 
Emotive 
interaction (I 
empathise that 
you are dead) 
& simple 
mortuary 
caching 
3 Archaic Homo I want you to 
believe that 
you must 
behave how 
we want 
True symbolism 
(I know that you 
understand that 
this symbol 
means this…) 
Associative 
symbolic 
caching (I 
know you 
must be 
deposited at a 
specific place) 
4 Homo 
neandertalensis, 
Homo sapiens 
I have to 
believe that 
you suppose 
that there are 
Time/space-
factored 
symbolism (I 
know, that you 
Time/space-
factored 
associative 
symbolism 
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supernatural 
beings who 
understand 
that you and I 
desire that 
things happen 
in a certain 
way 
understand, that 
this place gives 
meaning to this 
thing/person/act) 
(Because of 
your agency, 
you must be 
disposed of in 
this way, by 
this method, at 
this place, as 
recognised by 
our social 
rules) 
 
Table 1. Scales of the evolution of symbolism using Dunbar’s (2003) concept of 
evolution of the social brain and personal ornamentation and mortuary activity as 
examples. 
The difficulty, of course, will be to develop specific predictions of the archaeological 
record that we have a chance of addressing. With an archaeological record that is still 
overwhelmingly poor, particularly for Africa, and largely non-existent for much of the 
Old World, all we can do for now is to adopt parsimony in our interpretations. Thus I 
suggest that, in situations where we have only pigment fragments we need only infer 
decoration or enhancement; with simple burials perhaps only indicative of emotive 
interactions with the dead. As symbolic systems are elaborated, and in particular when 
they are employed in combination, one might reasonably infer more sophisticated forms 
of symbolism. I try to outline a set of archaeological predictions based on this notion of 
parsimonious interpretation in Table 2 
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Pigments Personal 
ornamentati
on 
Figurati
ve art 
Burial Parsimoniou
s symbolic 
function 
Chronolo
gy 
Ochre 
fragments/processi
ng 
   Decoration Intermitten
t from the 
Middle 
Pleistocen
e 
 Personal 
ornamentatio
n 
  Decoration Intermitten
t from 
>100 ka 
 Personal 
ornamentatio
n (selection 
of restricted 
shell taxa & 
colouring by 
burning) 
  Enhancement
, possibly 
accessorisatio
n 
Intermitten
t from 
>100 ka 
   Simple 
inhumati
on or 
depositio
n of the 
body 
Emotive 
interaction 
Intermitten
t (probably 
rare) from 
>100 ka 
Ochre 
fragments/processi
ng, selection of 
certain 
colours/saturated 
   Enhancement 
or 
accessorisatio
n 
Intermitten
t from 
>100 ka 
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hues 
Ochre fragments Personal 
ornamentatio
n 
  Combination 
suggests 
likelihood of 
enhancement 
or 
accessorisatio
n 
Intermitten
t from 
>100 ka 
   Multiple 
inhumati
on 
Associative 
interaction 
Intermitten
t from 
>100 ka 
Ochre fragments 
with engraved 
traditions 
Personal 
ornamentatio
n 
  Accessorisati
on or full 
symbolism 
Intermitten
t from 
>100 ka 
   Multiple 
inhumati
on & 
adjunct 
material 
culture 
(e.g. 
pigments, 
grave 
goods) 
Time/space-
factored 
associative 
interaction 
Intermitten
t, probably 
only from 
~30 ka 
Ochre fragments 
with engraved 
traditions 
Personal 
ornamentatio
n 
Art  Full 
space/time- 
factored 
symbolism 
Intermitten
t, probably 
only from 
~35 ka 
21 
 
Table 2. Potential archaeological signatures of developing levels of symbolism, based on 
various combinations of pigment use, engraving, personal ornamentation, burial and art. 
One cannot, of course, rule out that sophisticated symbolic systems might underlie simple 
manifestations of the data of concern, after all they often do in the modern world 
although one can at least use such an heuristic to evaluate observable levels of symbolic 
sophistication, if not the symbolic capacity itself. From Tables 1 and 2 I would infer that 
Homo heidelbergensis was capable of employing emotive interaction with the dead and 
perhaps decorative interaction with the living; Homo neandertalensis and early 
populations of Homo sapiens were capable of associative interaction with the dead and 
decorative, enhanced and accessorized interaction with the living; and only later 
populations of Homo sapiens were capable of full symbolic interaction with the living 
(perhaps intermittently after 80 ka BP) and that full time/space-factored interaction with 
both the living and the dead emerged relatively late, i.e. after 35 ka BP and was even then 
intermittent, probably for the duration of the Palaeolithic. 
As the cognitive and behavioural capacities of Homo sapiens and Homo neandertalensis 
are major research interests for current palaeoanthropology it is worth comparing the two 
in terms of some of the symbolic behaviours discussed above. Figure 1 shows the 
presence or absence of personal ornamentation and burial for each taxon, further divided 
into two regions, the Near East and Europe, and spanning the period 100-10 ka BP. The 
use of continual bars to donate the presence of these phenomena contains considerable 
imprecision of dating methods, and thus should not necessarily be taken to represent 
continuity within these periods. The figure is simply a very coarse reflection of the 
current state of knowledge (see Pettitt 2011 for a more contextualised discussion). A few 
very preliminary observations can be made from this. First, for Homo sapiens, there is a 
correlation between the presence/absence of burials in both Europe and the Near East and 
personal ornamentation; i.e. in periods where burial was practised personal ornamentation 
was produced too, and this pattern holds for populations in both Europe and the Near 
East. The picture for the Neandertals is not as clear, although Near Eastern burials appear 
around the same time as those in Europe but are truncated earlier, almost certainly 
because Neandertals became extinct in the region earlier than they did in Europe. A clear 
contrast with modern humans is the lack of personal ornamentation the sole exception 
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being the jewellery from the Grotte du Renne at Arcy-sur-Cure, assuming it was made by 
Neandertals. A final observation is that there is an inverse correlation between the two 
taxa: in the period that some Neandertals were burying some of their dead in Europe and 
the Near East, we have no examples for Homo sapiens, who are instead practising burial 
and personal ornamentation before and after the Neandertal practise of these phenomena. 
One would not yet want to place too much emphasis on this relatively poor record, but 
such regional trajectories may repay the effort of further study if and when the record 
improves. 
Conclusion 
This is by necessity a speculative paper, although I draw on the current state of 
knowledge for archaeological phenomena that are usually thought to be indicative of 
symbolic thought. It may be full of holes: the data I draw upon as examples are of course 
open to other interpretations; my reading of the existing archaeological record may be 
overly-critical, and the capacity for ‘symbolism’ may be heuristically divided in many 
other ways. It is also certain that the archaeological record will change as new discoveries 
are made, particularly in Africa and Asia. I hope at least, however, that the paper will 
stimulate discussion among Palaeolithic archaeologists as to how to develop our concepts 
of symbolism; after two decades of debate in which symbolism has emerged as the 
human capacity, we still use rudimentary concepts of what it is and how it is to be 
recognised archaeologically. These discussions began at the Cape Town workshop and, I 
hope, will continue to run. To be successful we have to problematise what we mean by 
symbolism. I’ve made a start here and throw down a friendly gauntlet.  
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